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Abstract Abstract
In the research addressing the prisoner's dilemma game, the effectiveness and
accountableness of the method allowing for the emergence of cooperation is generally
discussed. The most well-known solutions for this question are memory based iteration, the
tag used to distinguish between defector and cooperator, the spatial structure of the game
and the either direct or indirect reciprocity. We have also challenged to approach the topic
from a different point of view namely that temperate acquisitiveness in decision making could
be possible to achieve cooperation. It was already shown in our previous research that the
exclusion of the best decision had a remarkable effect on the emergence of an almost
cooperative state. In this paper, we advance the decision of our former research to become
more explainable by introducing the second-best decision. If that decision is adopted,
players also reach an extremely high level cooperative state in the prisoner's dilemma game
and also in that of extended strategy expression. The cooperation of this extended game is
facilitated only if the product of two parameters is under the criticality. In addition, the
applicability of our model to the problem in the real world is discussed.
Cooperation, Altruism, Agent-Based Simulation, Evolutionary Game Theory
 Introduction  Introduction
The prisoner's dilemma game and its repeated form, the iterated prisoner's dilemma game are
very popular and often used for studies that researches how cooperation arises when all
people pursue their own benefit. An eminent work of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game is
the Robert Axelrod's tournament that was held twice about 25 years ago (Axelrod 1984). In
the study, he found the toughness of the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy and the factor for the
development of mutual cooperation. Recently applications of the prisoner's dilemma game
have been widely spread in various areas: spatial extension (Nowak 1992; Cao 1999; Ahmed




uses square lattice or graph/network theory, n-person extension (Yao 1994; Seo 2000),
experiment for researching the cooperation of animal (Stephens 2002; Bshary 2006;
Warneken 2007; Rutte 2007), biological study about the interaction of phages (Turner 1999;
Turner 2003), bacteria (Griffin 2004; Fiegna 2006) and yeast (Craig MacLean 2006), and
behavioral study of humans regarding altruism (altruistic punishment) (Fehr 2002; Fehr
2003a; Fehr 2003b; Fowler 2005; Bernhard 2006; Kurzban 2007; Andres Guzman 2007;
Dawes 2007).
In the study of the prisoner's dilemma game, there are two important topics. First, what
method is effective for the emergence of cooperation. Second, once cooperation emerges,
how stable it is. These topics have been discussed for a long period of time, but they are still
inconclusive. There have been some methods challenging this question. It is thought that the
most successful one at present is indirect reciprocity (Nowak 1998a; Nowak 1998b;
Panchanathan 2003; Panchanathan 2004; Nowak 2005; Rockenbach 2006). In this model,
game players intend to increase their social reputation, and free riders (players who receive
social property without any costs) can not prevail because they have no chance to raise their
status.
We think there is a possibility that another method which differs from previously proposed
ideas realizes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. Please imagine a negotiation with
many conflicts of interest. Generally, all participants can not fully satisfy their desire. They
somewhat need to compromise in order to reach agreement. Besides, we often discard the
best choice and select the second-best one if we want to keep a good relationship. This kind
of action is seemingly like cooperative behavior and has not been dealt with by any previous
research.
Here, from this point of view, we study the property of cooperation based on some
compromise by using the model of agent based simulation. When every group composed of
some agents makes its second-best decision, cooperation at a high level is observed. It is
also revealed that cooperation does not develop in all cases. One condition like criticality
regarding the relationship between two parameters is essential for that growth. We also
discuss the applicability of our model to social phenomenon observed in the real world.
Model Model
Prisoner's Dilemma Game Prisoner's Dilemma Game
At first, we introduce the basics of the prisoner's dilemma game before the description of the
model. In the prisoner's dilemma game, the following scenario is commonly used. First, there
are two players and they can choose their strategies (Defection or Cooperation). Second, they
are separated from each other, so that each of them can not know the strategy of the
opponent. After choosing strategies, payoff of each player is decided by the payoff matrix
(Table 1). In the table, the meaning of every capitalized bold letter is as follows; T T -
T Temptation to defect, R R - R Reward for mutual cooperation, P P - P Punishment, S S - S Sucker's
payoff. In the prisoner's dilemma game, the condition T T>R R>P P>S S is necessary, and for the
iterated prisoner's dilemma game, the additional condition 2R R>T T+S S should be satisfied. The
payoff matrix meets both conditions.2.2 2.2
2.3 2.3
Table 1 Table 1. Payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma game
Looking at the payoff matrix, if you choose the strategy of Cooperation, you can get the
reward as long as your opponent cooperates. But if your opponent defects, you will have no
payoff. On the other hand, in the case that your strategy is Defection, you have the
opportunity to get the highest or at least minimum payoff. Therefore the strategy of Defection
is the most appropriate in the prisoner's dilemma game. However, if you and your opponent
think in the same way (take the strategy of defection), your payoff becomes smaller than in
the case of mutual cooperation. That is the reason this game is referred to as the prisoner's
'dilemma' game. However, if the game is repeated infinitely, defection is not always the best
strategy. If you can not know the number of iteration, mutual cooperation becomes one
option to get more payoff. This repeatedly played game is referred to as the iterated
prisoner's dilemma game. The effectiveness of strategy depends on the strategy of the
opponent. Research of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game generally discusses what types
of strategy get the most payoff (what the successful strategy is). The 'successful' strategy will
be used by many agents and become the majority.
As noted before, the most remarkable work of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game is the
Axelrod's tournament with computer simulation. This study reveals the essential factor for the
emergence of cooperation as follows (Maynard Smith 1982; Axelrod 1984). Players with the
TFT strategy must cooperate at the first iteration. They should remember the previous
strategy of the opponent (memory) and give profits to each other, i.e., they have to take the
same action as the past moves of the opponents (reciprocity). Because players do not know
how long the game lasts, they tend to make allowances for their opponents (the effect of the
'shadow of the future'). If a player wishes to keep a good (cooperative) relationship with the
other, he/she should not be prepossessed with the temptation of near future benefits by2.4 2.4
2.5 2.5
utilizing the strategy of defection.
Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Game Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Game
In most research regarding the prisoner's dilemma game (and also the iterated version), the
flaw exists that the variation of strategy is fixed and does not change during a simulation.
Axelrod has previously used genetic algorithms and succeeded in producing strategies which
are similar to the TFT strategy (Axelrod 1997). However, there are some prerequisite
conditions in this research; for example, agents play the game with a pre-prepared repertoire
of eight types of strategies. The TFT-like strategy does not evolve from the repeated
matching with each other. In addition, it uses a particular environment where the ratio of
eight representative strategies is definite.
To resolve this problem, we make the strategy of the prisoner's dilemma game more diverse
and also evolvable. In this research, we use the prisoner's dilemma game with the strategy of
extended form, which is named as the 'sequential' prisoner's dilemma game derived from the
expression of strategy (Ohdaira 2006; Ohdaira 2007). In this game, the player's strategy is
expressed as an array of length Ls that describes actions (Defection or Cooperation) in finite
rounds. The practice of the sequential prisoner's dilemma game is illustrated in Figure 1. You
may know a game that is similar to the sequential prisoner's dilemma game, which is usually
referred to as the centipede game (McNamara 2004). In the centipede game, the main aim of
the game is to see how long every player cooperates from the beginning of the game. The
game will continue until players defect once with each other. On the other hand, the
sequential prisoner's dilemma game concentrates on the frequency of cooperation (or
defection) in finite rounds.
Figure 1 Figure 1. Illustration of the sequential prisoner's dilemma game2.6 2.6
2.7 2.7
2.8 2.8
We describe the distinction between the sequential prisoner's dilemma game and the (iterated)
prisoner's dilemma game. Basically, the sequential prisoner's dilemma game is like the
prisoner's dilemma game because players have no chance to refer to the past moves of their
opponents once the game starts. However, if carefully compared, you can see that there is a
substantial difference in the diversity of strategies (2 vs. 2Ls patterns). The distinction
between the iterated prisoner's dilemma game and the sequential prisoner's dilemma game is
the structure of strategy. The strategy of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game is defined as a
reactive motion to the past choice of the opponent. On the other hand, in the sequential
prisoner's dilemma game, there is no reference to the past move of his/her opponent. The
action of the game player in every round of the prisoner's dilemma game is already regulated
by his/her strategy at the beginning of the game. Furthermore, each strategy can be updated
by the use of evolutionary computation described below. Hence, the expression of strategy is
fundamentally different between the iterated and the sequential forms of the game.
Using a mathematical equation, the strategy of player u is designated as a sequential array
whose length is Ls (1). Each character represents a move of one round (D: Defection, C:
Cooperation). Precisely, D or C means the component vector, which is expressed as (0, 1) or
(1, 0). The former represents that the selection in one round is defection, the latter shows the
player chooses cooperation.
(1)
Details of the Model Details of the Model
The focus of our research is not only modeling a specific phenomenon but also offering some
novel knowledge about the research of the prisoner's dilemma game, especially in the
evolvability of strategy. To achieve this purpose, the framework of the match is simplified.
One agent will play the game against the agent of the same ID in the opponent group. The
reason why the game is played between two agents of the same ID is because we follow the
basis of simple spatial game where an opponent player does not change. We would like to
apply the model to a spatial game smoothly in future work. On the other hand, the strategy of
an agent has evolvability in comparison with other research, and also evolves based on the
decision of each assigned group. Every group has a finite number (Na) of agents respectively.
Agents of both groups have an ID (from 1 to Na) and a strategy of the sequential prisoner's
dilemma game (that will be simply noted as a strategy). Each strategy is randomly initialized
(the configuration of every strategy is a random sequence of cooperation and defection). An
outline of the model is illustrated in Figure 2.2.9 2.9
2.10 2.10
Figure 2 Figure 2. Outline of the model
The payoff of each agent in the group at generation g is numerically expressed in the
following equation (2). If the group i whose opponent group has the ID j is focused, the agent
u in the group i gets his/her payoff Pi
g(u) respectively. A designates the payoff matrix, and
where αi
k(u) and αj
k(u) means the element of strategy (1).
(2)
After all agents of both groups finish their sequential prisoner's dilemma game, the decision
of each group will be made separately. 'Decision' in this case means the selection of the
representative strategy of the group. Every group has initiative in the choice. If the
representative strategy is decided, then the process of the evolution of strategy starts. The
process is composed of the following two steps. First, two parts of the representative strategy
are copied to other strategies in turn (duplication). The length of fraction randomly changes
in every duplication. Second, each character of the newly created strategies is reversed
according to the uniform rate (Rm) (mutation). The mutation, which is conducted after the
creation of all new strategies, may be regarded as a mistake by humans in decision making.
The method controlling the evolution of strategy is similar to the crossover in common
genetic algorithm (GA). However, in fact, the process in this research is achieved by2.11 2.11
2.12 2.12
2.13 2.13
segmental duplication, which is different from the procedure of GA (in which individuals of
the next generation are created by the crossover of some candidates). You can consider that
the evolution of strategy is the partial adoption of the representative strategy by each agent.
Figure 3 also illustrates the process.
Figure 3 Figure 3. Illustration of the evolutionary process
The above process is executed independently in both groups. The representative strategy
itself does not change except for mutation. This mechanism of selecting a representative and
updating other strategies is called the 'evolutionary process'. Through this process, every
strategy is updated and ready for the following match. This procedure from the match of the
sequential prisoner's dilemma game to the evolutionary process is defined as one generation,
and to investigate the fluctuation over a long period, one simulation runs until the number of
generations reaches to 5,000. All results described later depict the average of 30 simulation
runs.
Introduction of the Second-best Decision Introduction of the Second-best Decision
In the context of the prisoner's dilemma game, as we noted before, if all players take the
rational strategy, it is thought that mutual cooperation would not develop without additional
constraints that control either the range of interaction or the decision of each player. Our
model with the optimal response (rational decision) also reaches a state where all players
defect against another in every round even if alternate procedures of crossover are used. This
situation is called 'Nash equilibrium' in game theory, and is not desirable for game players
because they have the chance to get higher payoff through mutual cooperation.
Constraints often mentioned before are the 'tag' (Riolo 1997; Hales 2001; Riolo 2001), the2.14 2.14
3.1 3.1
'spatial structure' (Nowak 1992; Cao 1999; Ahmed 2002; Kim 2002; Hauert 2004; Nowak
2004; Ohtsuki 2006; Fort 2007) and 'indirect reciprocity' (Nowak 1998a; Nowak 1998b;
Panchanathan 2003; Panchanathan 2004; Nowak 2005; Rockenbach 2006). The first one
means that game players can distinguish each other by the use of their identifier. A player can
refer to the tag of another player and know whether he/she is cooperative or not. The second
is introduced to define neighborhood connection around agents. In the spatial game, agents
interact only with those who are directly connected. Even if simple Markovian or one step
conditional strategies (like TFT or Pavlov) are used, a system with the spatial structure can
escape from Nash equilibrium (Fort 2007). Those strategies can be deterministic or binary.
The third is advanced study of tag based solution. In the model of indirect reciprocity,
cooperation can arise even though recipients do not have the opportunity to return profits to
their donors. This mechanism is generally based on the system that everyone who helps
others can raise his/her reputation and it brings him/her the chance that he/she is helped by
others. Indirect reciprocity is also achieved by less sophisticated agents, without depending
on reputation, when the agents can compare themselves with their opponents or detect
whether their payoffs are under the threshold which is necessary to survive (Fort 2003).
In this research, as a new candidate to establish cooperation, we introduce the 'second-best
decision' that means every group adopts the second-best strategy as his/her representative
strategy. In former research, we have studied cooperation based on the decision that all
groups do not desire to get more payoffs (Ohdaira 2006; Ohdaira 2007). The second-best
decision is more improved and practical than the one used in those previous studies
(elimination of the best strategy, which was named as the perfectly altruistic decision). If one
group adopts the second-best decision, the representative strategy of the group becomes the
strategy of 'second grade' regarding payoff. If all strategies become first grade, one strategy
is randomly chosen from them. In recent research about brain science (Tankersley 2007;
Krueger 2007), it has been revealed that people are naturally moderate altruist. These studies
also remark that both the choice of altruistic behavior and the construction of cooperation are
pleasant to humans. Those findings support our proposition that there is a case where
cooperation is facilitated by the action of sacrifice like the second-best decision.
Results Results
Basic Sets of Variables Basic Sets of Variables
Before researching various parameters, the effect of mutation rate (Rm) is examined. The
middle value in this research (Na=8, Ls=30) is used, and the finite range of Rm (from 1.0E-
04 to 3.0E-03) is tested. The result is shown in Figure 4. In the figure, the average frequency
of mutual cooperation (Fmc) regarding all generations becomes highest when Rm is equal to
5.0E-04. The average frequency of mutual defection (Fmd) regarding all generations also has
its lowest peak with that value. The value is applied to all examinations because in this
research we focus on both the Fmd and the Fmc for all generations rather than the last
generation. Further examination reveals that Fmc/Ls of both the last and all generations takes
a value above 0.80 when Rm is in the range of 1.5E-04 (minimum) to 1.1E-03 (maximum). If
Rm exceeds the maximum, Fmc gradually decreases for both results. On the other hand,
when Rm drops under the minimum, Fmc is still high up at Rm=7.5E-04 except regarding the
result of all generations.3.2 3.2
3.3 3.3
In the following, we show the results of basic sets of variables, which means that pairs of
parameters are simple, that is, either very low Na or Ls changes (Figure 5 and 6). Please note
that the rate of mutual defection (Rmd) and cooperation (Rmc) show how often each agent
mutually defects (or cooperates) in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game. Each value can be
found as follows; Rmd=Fmd/Ls and Rmc=Fmc/Ls. As is commonly seen in all the results of
this research, the standard deviation (SD) for either Fmc or Rmc is comparatively large at the
average of all generations. On the other hand, at the average of the last generation, the SD for
each value is small. This phenomenon is derived from the variation between each run in the
process of evolution. When Rmc is larger than 0.80 at the average of the last generation, the
SD for Rmc is quite small. In that case, it is permissible to remark that a high level
cooperative state is eventually realized by evolution based on the second-best decision.
Figure 5 is the simple case of two agents in both groups. From this result, you can see that
Rmc regarding the last generation does not change too much even though the length of
strategy (Ls) in each group increases. It indicates that agents finally cooperate regardless of
the strategy length. Figure 6 exhibits the result of Ls=1 with changes in the number of agents.
In this case, the game is regarded as the simple prisoner's dilemma game. Our model with the
second-best decision shows its high effectiveness for the emergence of mutual cooperation.
Especially regarding the result of all generations, Fmc steadily increases although the number
of agents grows.
Figure 4 Figure 4. The dependence of the frequency of mutual defection (Fmd) and mutual
cooperation (Fmc) on mutation rate (Rm) regarding the average of the last generation and all
generations (Na=8, Ls=30, ±SD)Figure 5 Figure 5. The rate of mutual defection (Rmd) and mutual cooperation (Rmc) (Na=2, Ls=1 to
5, ±SD) regarding the average of the last generation and all generations
Figure 6 Figure 6. This figure show the dependence of the frequency of mutual defection (Fmd) and3.4 3.4
3.5 3.5
3.6 3.6
mutual cooperation (Fmc) on Na (Na=2 to 32, Ls=1, ±SD). In this case, the game takes the
form of the simple prisoner's dilemma game
Various Sets of Variables Various Sets of Variables
In the previous section, it is revealed that the second-best decision has an effect on the
development of mutual cooperation in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game with simple
situations. Next we show the results of various parameters, altering Na and Ls in a wider
range. The traits of the second-best decision are probed from many viewpoints.
Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 exhibit the dependence of Rmc and Rmd on Ls in cases of Na=4, 8, 16
and 32. In the results of Na=4 and 8 (Figure 7, 8), general characteristics of Rmd and Rmc do
not differ greatly. Rmc slightly decreases when Ls grows. Nevertheless, its value is still high
(around 0.80) in the case of Ls=50. On the other hand, the increase of Rmd is considerably
suppressed at each Ls. These results show that the second-best decision works well for the
emergence of cooperation. Figure 9 (at the case of Na=16) demonstrates another property.
Rmc decreases rapidly when Ls exceeds 40. Moreover, for the case of Na=32 (Figure 10), Rmc
is high only when Ls ≤ 20. These results do not change any more if the number of
generations is doubled (from 5,000 to 10,000). Therefore, Rmd and Rmc are fully stable
within 5,000 generations.
It is considered from these results that at high Na, Rmc decreases when Ls lengthens. This
situation is caused by the diversity of initial strategies derived from the increase of Ls (and
also Na). In that case, mutual cooperation can not easily settle among players. It is supposed
from the results that the second-best decision is valid at every Na in the case that Ls is
approximately under the critical value. The evidence of this supposition is described in the
discussion section.Figure 7 Figure 7. The rate of mutual defection (Rmd) and mutual cooperation (Rmc) regarding the
average of the last generation and all generations (Na=4,±SD)
Figure 8 Figure 8. Rmd and Rmc regarding the average of the last generation and all generations(Na=8,±SD)
Figure 9 Figure 9. Rmd and Rmc regarding the average of the last generation and all generations
(Na=16,±SD)4.1 4.1
Figure 10 Figure 10. Rmd and Rmc regarding the average of the last generation and all generations
(Na=32,±SD)
Discussion Discussion
Evaluation of the Critical Value Evaluation of the Critical Value
From the examination of various sets of Na and Ls, a criticality is found where Fmc no longer
increases even if Ls lengthens. The critical length of strategy in each Na is studied and the
results are also designated in Figures 11 to 13. If Na equals 8 (Figure 11), the critical length
Lsc is approximately 80 (NaLsc≅6.4E+02). In the case of Na=16 (Figure 12), Lsc is nearly 35
(NaLsc≅5.6E+02). When Na has the value of 32 (Figure 13), Lsc roughly has the value of 20
(NaLsc≅6.4E+02). When mutual cooperation is at a high level, the range of Ls is necessarily
under the value of Lsc in each case of Na.
Figure 11 Figure 11. The frequency of mutual defection (Fmd) and mutual cooperation (Fmc) around
the critical value of Ls regarding the average of the last generation and all generations
(Na=8,±SD)Figure 12 Figure 12. Fmd and Fmc around the critical value of Ls regarding the average of the last
generation and all generations (Na=16,±SD)
Figure 13 Figure 13. Fmd and Fmc around the critical value of Ls regarding the average of the last4.2 4.2
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generation and all generations (Na=32,±SD)
Applicability of our Model to Problems in the Real World Applicability of our Model to Problems in the Real World
As we noted before, our model does not precisely express specific social phenomenon.
However, the second-best decision in the model, which is the pursuit of moderate payoff and
not maximum profit is similar to the mindset of collusive bidding. This bid-rigging scandal
has become a significant social problem in Japan.
If you contemplate the strategy of the prisoner's dilemma game, you can see that outwitting
the opponent in a bid can be regarded as defection and proposing the same price is also
considered to be cooperation. Therefore, the strategy of our research corresponds to price
bidding for each object at one time (Figure 14). The scenario of this model, which is that
some matches are played between two groups at once, seems to be unrealistic because it
correlates to the proposal of simultaneous price bidding. However, if you regard that context
as the following method, the setting of this model becomes fully practical. First, bids are
continuously made in some rounds (=Na=8 in this model). Second, the second-best decision
is made based on the result of finite rounds. Third, subsequent proposals for continuous bids
are prepared through decision (evolutionary process). You may think that the match between
agents of the same ID seems to hinder evolution in the model. Nevertheless, that framework
will become natural if an ID is recognized at the time of bidding (round 1, round 2,…; please
refer to Figure 15).
Some methods have been proposed for the research of collusive bidding; for example, using
the system based on the auction theory (Graham 1987; McAfee 1992), or trying to approach
the question from the realm of experimental economics (Saijo 1996). Despite the limit of
players (only two), our notion described here is novel and also significant because there has
been no former research which has dealt with a case where spontaneously bidding players
sacrifice their own payoff to some extent. As noted before, when the value of NaLs is over the
criticality, cooperation is not facilitated even if each group adopts the second-best decision.
From the result, it is expected that the increase of either the variety of proposals for bids
(=Na) or the number of bidding objects in one bid (=Ls) makes it difficult to collude with each
other.Figure 14 Figure 14. Introduction of specific manner bidding





We have introduced a new method for mutual cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. It
is referred to as the 'second-best decision' in this research, and works effectively when the
product of NaLs is under the criticality. Our model challenges to offer other aspects of
research to the prisoner's dilemma game, especially regarding strategy. In previous research,
strategies have been limited in number or in pattern. Therefore, we improved strategy to
become much more diverse and evolvable. The main feature of our model is summarized by
the following two points. The first one is the variation derived from the structure of strategy.
As strategy lengthens, it will become more varied. The second one is the evolvability of
strategy. Through the evolutionary process, every strategy is consistently overwritten by the
representative strategy. Patterns of strategy are quite large.
As we described in section 3, the second-best decision loses its effect on the development of
mutual cooperation in the case of large Na (or Ls). The reason why that phenomenon occurs is
that the diversity of strategy types is expanded. The result is understandable when it is
compared to the situation of practical negotiation where there are many strategies (in other
words, many opinions). In that situation, it is quite difficult to reach an agreement. That
phenomenon did not occur in our previous research which treated perfectly altruistic
decision. This is the fact that the second-best decision is not an expression of pure altruism,
but has a selfish nature to some extent and also shows its practicality. It is significant for the
applicability of the model that there is a case where cooperation is not facilitated even if each
group acts somewhat altruistically. As described before, cooperative groups are similar to the
minds of collusive companies. By further research, we can find more detailed conditions that
interfere with cooperation, which is beneficial to the construction of rules for the prevention
of collusive bidding.
At the present time, it is no doubt that the combination of the second-best decision and the
evolutionary process has an effect on the emergence of cooperation. On the other hand, each
strategy becomes uniform quite rapidly by that mechanism. We can not consequently remark
from these results which method is the best scheme to facilitate cooperation. Either the rapid
homogenization or the conservation of diversity at the initial generation. Our task in the
future is to resolve this question through the use of another system in place of the procedure
utilized in this research.
Appendix 1: results of two cases (either no duplication or no Appendix 1: results of two cases (either no duplication or no
mutation) mutation)
As shown in figure 16 below (Na=8, Ls=30, with the second-best decision), those cases do
not achieve a highly cooperative state. In the case of no duplication, Fmd and Fmc fluctuate
little (approximate 7.5) through the effect of mutation. On the other hand, when the mutation
rate Rm is equal to 0 (no mutation), Fmd increases and Fmc decreases slightly at initial
generation, but does not change any more for the rest of the generation. As a result, it is
concluded that the collaboration of duplication and mutation (and also the second-best
decision) facilitates mutual cooperation.A.2 A.2
Figure 16 Figure 16.
Appendix 2: comparison between two methods (original vs 1 part Appendix 2: comparison between two methods (original vs 1 part
duplication) duplication)
This research uses the method of 2 part duplication as the original method in the evolutionary
process, because it performed much better than 1 part duplication, i.e., the convergence to
the mutual cooperative state is faster (the following Figure 17, Na=8, Ls=30, with the
second-best decision). The values of standard deviation (SD) regarding the Fmc in the last
generation are quite different. In the case of 1 part duplication, the SD roughly equals 3.13,
on the other hand, the SD in the original method is nearly 0.82. Now we plan to investigate
differences between other methods in future work.Figure 17 Figure 17.
Appendix 3: pseudo code regarding main routine Appendix 3: pseudo code regarding main routine
Function Main:
Start:
// The number of groups equals two in this research.
  for number_of_generations (<= from 1,000 to 5,000):
    for group_id (<= number_of_groups):
      Play_Match (group_id):
      Update_Strategy (group_id):
    end for:




  // The sequential prisoner's dilemma game is played between the agents
  // of the same id.
  // The number of total game is equal to the number of opponent groups.
  // The number of opponent groups equals one in this research.
  for opponent_group_id (<= number_of_opponent_groups):
    for agent_id (<= number_of_agents, Na):
      for rounds (<= length_of_strategy, Ls):
        if Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds] == D and
        Strategy[opponent_group_id][agent_id][rounds] == C then:
          Score[Group_ID][agent_id]
          = Score[Group_ID][agent_id] + 5:
        end if:
        else if Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds] == C and
        Strategy[opponent_group_id][agent_id][rounds] == C then:
          Score[Group_ID][agent_id]
          = Score[Group_ID][agent_id] + 3:
        end else if:        else if Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds] == D and
        Strategy[opponent_group_id][agent_id][rounds] == D then:
          Score[Group_ID][agent_id]
          = Score[Group_ID][agent_id] + 1:
        end else if:
        else:
          Score[Group_ID][agent_id]
          = Score[Group_ID][agent_id] + 0:
        end else:
      end for:
    end for:
  end for:
  // Final score about the strategy of agent is the average of all Sequential PDGs.
  for agent_id (<= Na):
    Score[Group_ID][agent_id]
    = Score[Group_ID][agent_id] / number_of_opponent_groups:




  // All strategies of agents about the group are graded by their score.
  Grade_Strategy:
  // The strategy of the second grade in the group is selected as the representative
  // strategy. The representative agent ID (=strategy ID) is decided.
  representative_agent_id = agent_id (with the second grade strategy):
  // Note. Both values of the length_of_fraction_1 (Lf1) and the
  // length_of_fraction_2 (Lf2) are randomly changes in every step.
  // The Lf1 and the Lf2 are less than Ls. The Lf1 is smaller than the Lf2.
  // The representative strategy is partly duplicated to every strategy as follows.
  for agent_id (<= Na, not equal to the representative agent ID):
    for rounds_1 (<= Lf1):
      Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds_1] =
      Strategy[Group_ID][representative_agent_id][rounds_1]:
    end for:
    for rounds_2 (Lf2 <= rounds_2 <= Ls):
      Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds_2] =
      Strategy[Group_ID][representative_agent_id][rounds_2]:
    end for:
  end for:
  // The process of mutation is executed for every strategy of agent.
  for agent_id (<= Na):
    for rounds (<= Ls):
      if (a value randomly generated is over the threshold) then:
        if Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds] == C then:
          Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds] = D:
        end if:
        else:
          Strategy[Group_ID][agent_id][rounds] = C:
        end else:
      end if:
    end for:
  end for:
End:
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